Betting on the Wrong
Horse
It is easy to dismiss Saudi Arabia’s execution binge last
weekend as barbarism or as a throwback to some form of medieval spectacle. Looking
beyond the carnage, it is worth asking what these acts convey about the
position of the Saudi state, both domestically and diplomatically. Why a mass
execution and why now? To do so is to face an uncomfortable truth: the Saudi
government doesn’t engage in mass executions because it is barbaric, but
because it can. And above all, it is the United States that—much to its own
detriment—grants the Kingdom the diplomatic cover to so brazenly flout the most
basic legal conventions.
The killings are a signal that even in an era of falling oil
prices, Saudi Arabia is still in a position of strength. This was clear enough in
the State Department’s press briefings earlier this week, in which John Kirby stretched
the English language to its creative limits in order to not condemn the executions. When the spokesperson for the U.S.
Department of State appeals to his unfamiliarity with the Saudi judicial system
and claims, “It’s not for us to cast
judgment” on the decisions of other sovereign states, you know the stars have
aligned over the Arabian Peninsula.
It is interesting to note that the events of January 2nd
marked the Kingdom’s largest mass execution since January 1980, when the
government publicly beheaded 63 rebels who seized control over the Grand Mosque
in Mecca the year before. Then as now, Saudi Arabia faced regional upheaval, an
ascendant Iran, and internal dissent from Islamists who contested the ruling
family’s corruption, ostentatious lifestyle, and close ties with Western
leaders. Yet, at least in material terms, January 1980 also seems like a world
away from January 2016. Oil prices rose sharply in late 1979 and peaked at
around $116 a barrel (adjusted for inflation) in April of 1980, sending
countries worldwide into an economic frenzy over OPEC’s capacity to hold the
energy market hostage to its political whims.
In contrast, oil prices are currently hovering around $37 a
barrel and the IMF has recently reported that Saudi Arabia could run out of
cash in less than five years. Based on this economic forecast alone, one might
guess that Saudi Arabia is feeling particularly vulnerable today as a rentier
state that relies on robust social welfare programs to quell internal unrest.
But this is only part of the picture, because the American government is
essentially subsidizing the Saudi state’s domestic stronghold and diplomatic
strength. Saudi Arabia could execute Islamist dissidents en masse in 1980
because it was certain no one would either care or protest in any meaningful
way. The same remains true in 2016, a fact that largely stems from America’s
own misguided notion that Saudi Arabia is a key ally in a region where there
are no better alternatives.
We have seen this before: from Mubarak’s Egypt to the Shah
of Iran and Batista’s Cuba, America has a long history of supporting the
dictatorial and despotic ways of allies who allegedly help secure our national
best interests. The realpolitik camp
will have us think that these alliances result from the amoral nature of
politics, and if widespread domestic oppression in the countries we support is
the price of securing American interests, so be it. To be clear: I don’t oppose
this approach on account of some naïve idealism, but because as a historian of
the modern Middle East, I don’t see any evidence that it works. There are at least
two key problems with this mode of strategic thinking, both of which should
call the American alliance with Saudi Arabia into question.
First, it is an incredibly short-sighted policy that, with
the benefit of historical hindsight, should be archived along with the other
artifacts of Red Scare. We cannot pursue such partnerships in an era of mass
politics without expecting a popular backlash to follow us home and undermine
us abroad. In the immediate context, for example, there is no historical
explanation for the rise of Islamic radicalism that can overlook the role of
American foreign policy in rendering religious politics those of the oppressed
masses. In this case, the alliances our Cold War leaders viewed as ugly but
necessary have helped propel what we now define as the greatest threat to
American security.
Second, the idea that there are no alternatives has always
been and continues to be patently false. In many instances, some of those
alternatives were even democratically elected. But, as in Mossadegh’s Iran,
they wanted to do unseemly things like nationalize their natural resources and
impose labor rules on American and European corporations. What appeared to the
Eisenhower administration as unconscionable now strikes many Americans as pretty
tame in hindsight. This begs the question as to what we are currently missing in terms of our
strategic imagination, and brings us back to Saudi Arabia, one of America’s
chief allies in the so-called War on Terror.
By virtue of this position, Saudi Arabia has achieved near carte
blanche to imprison and execute dissidents at will. The fact that the Obama
administration’s “concern” regarding the January 2nd executions has
been mostly limited to the case of Sheikh al-Nimr—with the other 46 individuals
often dismissed en bulk as al-Qaeda operatives—is a reminder that in the years
since 9/11, Americans have reacted with general indifference to the execution
of anyone who can be labeled an Islamist or terrorist. How many of those 46
convictions would stand up in a real court of law is almost besides the point
when the War on Terror provides the Kingdom with the political cover to root
out opponents in this fashion.
It is also worth noting that the executions of January 2nd are not merely a sign of strength, but also a performative act – an opportunity for the Saudi state to show itself as even more puritanical than its Islamist foes. Not coincidentally, the executions in 1980 marked a turning point for the Kingdom after which, aiming at undercutting the claims of its critics, the state granted increased authority to clerics and began implementing shari’a in a more rigid fashion. The general uptick in executions throughout 2015 should be similarly understood within the context of Saudi Arabia’s attempts to cast itself as the morally righteous defender of true Islam.
If mass executions by one of America’s purported allies in
the fight against ISIS seem a bit too close for comfort, this is also no mere
coincidence. Whether it be ISIS distributing the writings of Abd al-Wahhab in
occupied regions of Syria or appealing directly to recruits from the Arabian
Peninsula, the ideological symbiosis between ISIS and the Saudi regime is hard
to overlook. Saudi Arabia and ISIS oppose one another not because they advance
competing views of Islam, but because they disagree over who should rule the
Sunni world. This is less a battle over theology or practice than over claims
to political and moral authority.
All this renders the notion that Saudi Arabia can serve as
America’s ally in a battle against radical Islam almost comical. The Kingdom
might be an ally in the struggle to contain ISIS, but it serves in this
capacity out of pure self-interest rather than on account of some ideological
alignment with the American agenda. And even if America’s goal is merely to
defeat the separatists in black currently controlling vast swaths of Syria and
Iraq, Saudi Arabia appears as no better ally in this struggle than Iran. Either
way, hitching our cart to the Saudi royal family produces little in the way of
short-term advantage, and like other episodes in our realpolitik fantasy, threatens to harm us even more down the road.